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Abstract 
Economic nationalism is on the rise, while decision-making is floundering within 
multilateral and regional trade institutions. As stakes ‘take back control’ over their trade 
policies, what does this imply for domestic and global inequalities? The paper will 
clarify how a state’s trade policy can affect what matters about domestic inequalities, 
global procedural fairness, and global distributional inequality. A state should aim to: 
i) pursue gains in national income, without making excessive contributions of its ‘policy 
space’ on issues that matter for disadvantaged groups; ii) refrain from abusing its 
unilateral decision-making power over its trading partners; and iii) prioritize trade 
liberalization with poor countries that have the competencies to take advantage of 
economic opportunities and that are likely to share the benefits of prosperity with 
disadvantaged citizens. There is room for a state’s trade policy to represent 
improvements over existing multilateral and regional institutions with respect to these 
aims, although improvements are by no means guaranteed. 
 
Keywords: fair trade, equality, global distributive justice, procedural fairness 
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Introduction 
 
Economic nationalism is on the rise, while decision-making is floundering within 
multilateral and regional trade institutions. These trends are highlighted by the 
collapse of the Doha round of negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
the US’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the US and the UK taking 
steps that could lead to withdrawal from NAFTA and the EU’s Single Market and 
Customs Union, respectively. The WTO and, to a lesser extent, the EU and other 
regional institutions have figured prominently in debates about where there should be 
limits on inequalities. Some participants in this debate have argued that states could 
not feasibly ‘take back control’ over their trade policies from these institutions, while 
others have argued that states retain this capacity but usually will not exercise it.1 As 
decision-making on trade shifts from multilateral institutions to preferential trade 
agreements and unilateral policies, it is unclear whether advocates of equality have 
more reason for hope or despair.  
 
Political forces of nationalism, visible in ‘America First’ and similar slogans in other 
countries, provide an important explanation for the shift in political rhetoric and action 
on trade policy. Political leaders claim they can secure a better deal for disadvantaged 
citizens through preferential trade agreements. On their view, multilateral trade 
institutions are procedurally unfair and tend to favour other countries at their citizens’ 
expense. Opposition to economic globalization is another important explanation for 
the shift. Many economists fear the decline of multilateralism will lead to greater trade 
protectionism, thereby slowing the pace of trade liberalization and limiting the 
prospects of poor countries. Reflecting upon these two explanations—rising 
nationalism and anti-globalization sentiment—it could be thought that the shift away 
from multilateral trade institutions represents an advance for the ethics of nationalism 
and a defeat for the ethics of cosmopolitanism. On this brief assessment, advocates 
for limiting domestic inequalities can rejoice, while advocates for reducing global 
inequalities should despair. 2 
 
However, the idea that a state has received a ‘bad deal’ from trade has broad appeal 
across the divide between nationalists and cosmopolitans. While the most prominent 
critics of ‘bad trade deals’ lately have been nationalists and political leaders espousing 
anti-globalization rhetoric, cosmopolitans and enthusiasts of economic globalization 
have made similar claims about developing countries’ limited access to rich countries’ 
markets. Moreover, multilateral and regional trade institutions are imperfect 
realizations (at best!) of ideals of global procedural fairness and global distributive 
                                                     
1
 Nagel (2005) argues that the WTO is dissimilar to the coercive authority of a state, while Pogge 
(2008) claims the WTO imposes harms on poor countries by denying them the benefits of trade 
liberalization. In contrast to both, James (2005; 2012: 77-102) argues that trade negotiations in the 
WTO represents a site of governance without ‘sovereign rule.’  
2
 Moellendorf (2005: 158-159), Brandi (2014), and Risse (2017) all express concern that departures 
from multilateralism will worsen the prospects for global justice.  
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equality, so there is room for potential improvements in these respects. Shifting 
decision-making to states will not necessarily represent an improvement in what 
matters about domestic equality, nor will it necessarily represent a setback in what 
matters about global equality. This paper will describe the ideal design of a state’s 
trade policy so that it generates improvements over existing multilateral and regional 
institutions, without venturing probabilistic statements about whether these 
improvements are likely to occur. 
 
The three sections of this paper correspond to its accounts of the stakes of trade policy 
for domestic equality, global procedural fairness, and global distributional equality. 
First, I endorse a political-economic account of the function of a trade agreement, and 
I argue that a ‘good deal’ for a state offers prospective gains in national income that 
compensate for its contribution of valuable policy space. Second, I endorse criticisms 
of global procedural fairness in the WTO that have been advanced by defenders of 
special and differential treatment, and I take these criticisms further. Third, I argue that 
concerns of global distributive equality require states to unilaterally liberalize, even at 
some cost to their valuable policy space, and they should prioritize liberalization with 
countries at low levels of economic development that are also competent and inclusive 
societies. In sum, a state should aim for its trade policy to: i) pursue gains in national 
income, without making excessive contributions of its ‘policy space’ on issues that 
matter for disadvantaged groups; ii) refrain from abusing its unilateral decision-making 
power over its trading partners; and iii) prioritize trade liberalization with poor countries 
that have the competencies to take advantage of economic opportunities and are likely 
to share the benefits of prosperity with disadvantaged citizens.  
 
1. How trade agreements can represent ‘bad deals’ for a state  
 
There is a near consensus among economists that, for any country, reducing its own 
barriers to trade will result in gains in national income.3 If political leaders are motivated 
to increase national income, it is puzzling why they would reduce their state’s barriers 
to trade only on the condition that other states do so as well. Economists widely 
suspect that trade agreements and trade institutions are the result of political leaders’ 
poor grasp of economics, specifically their adherence to a discredited, mercantilist 
theory of trade (Krugman, 1997). In this section, I will describe the idea of a ‘bad deal’ 
with reference to three reputable positions in the debate among economists and 
political economists about the function of trade agreements. I will advance the position 
that trade agreements represent a state’s contribution of its policy space, which can 
be a ‘bad deal’ when it does not produce prospects of worthwhile gains in national 
income.  
                                                     
3
 Some argue that developing countries should not be required to liberalize trade immediately, which 
is an objection to the temporal sequencing of liberalization, or not entirely, with exceptions for some 
‘infant industry protections,’ in order to maximize prospective gains in national income. The evidence 
is less clear about the relationship between trade liberalization and poverty alleviation, see (Winters 
et. al., 2004). 
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Most economists take the position that trade agreements and trade institutions serve 
no rational purpose, since it is in the economic interest of a state to liberalize its 
existing barriers to trade even if other states fail to do so. When trade negotiations fail, 
a state that has liberalized its barriers to trade on a unilateral basis can still complain 
about their failure. The state’s national income has not increased as much as possible, 
because this requires other states to reduce their own barriers to trade. Fernando 
Tesón, a libertarian political theorist, has endorsed the position that states can be 
criticized for failing to increase their own and other states’ national incomes through 
trade liberalization (2012; Tesón and Klick, 2012). What he adds to the economists’ 
analysis is that the lost opportunities for gains in national income have the greatest 
ethical significance when poor people can be expected to suffer these losses. For 
Tesón, the lost opportunities for disadvantaged groups in developed countries, 
particularly low-income consumers, and the global poor, have the greatest ethical 
significance. Tesón argues it is a requirement of justice that any state, especially a 
developed country, should adopt a free trade policy. 
 
The claim that a trade agreement is a ‘bad deal’ for a state is at odds with the position 
that a state ought to liberalize regardless of what other states do. Consider a state that 
has unilaterally reduced its barriers to trade, in order to increase its national income. 
This action provides a public good for other states, whose national incomes will 
increase regardless of their own action (or lack thereof) to liberalize trade. Since the 
state has provided a public good and other states fail to do likewise, it could be viewed 
as a failure of reciprocity or ‘fair play.’ 4 On a duty of fair play, an actor makes a 
contribution to the public good that comes at a cost to himself; other actors who accept 
these benefits have a duty to undertake the same costly action in order to provide him 
with benefits in return.5 However, the ‘fair play’ argument does not apply if we adopt 
the economists’ position that the liberalizing state incurs no costs from its actions. 
Tesón’s argument that a free trade policy is a requirement of justice is also 
incompatible with the claim that a liberalizing state receives a ‘bad deal’ when other 
states fail to liberalize. Other states’ failures to liberalize do not alter the content of the 
state’s duty of justice to liberalize, nor do they increase the burden of the duty—again, 
because it is in the state’s own economic interest to liberalize. 
 
Economists Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger (2002) have argued there are certain 
conditions under which a state can maximize its national income through 
protectionism. They show that, theoretically, a large state could alter the global terms 
of trade in its favour by restricting imports. If a large state can use protectionism to 
increase its national income at the expense of other countries, it is not always in a 
state’s economic interest to unilaterally liberalize. Under these conditions, trade 
                                                     
4
 Kapstein (2006) argues for a duty of reciprocity between trading states that is ‘diffuse’ rather than 
‘strict’ in character.  
5
 The duty of fair play is most frequently discussed in the context of political obligation, which 
assumes obeying the law is costly for the agent (Dagger and Lefkowitz, 2014).   
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agreements and multilateral trade institutions have a function for political leaders who 
seek to increase the national income. Bagwell and Staiger argue that trade 
agreements and institutions structure cooperation among states to achieve reciprocal 
reductions in their barriers to trade, without altering the terms of global trade. Aaron 
James’ influential theory of fairness in trade endorses Bagwell and Staiger’s 
explanation of the function of trade agreements and multilateral trade institutions 
(James, 2012: 35-75). On James’ view, states make agreements to assure others they 
will refrain from engaging in ‘beggar thy neighbour’ protectionism. James argues that 
claims of fairness apply to the practice of international trade, partially because states 
make these contributions at some cost to themselves, in terms of their foregone gains 
in national income.  
 
Even if trade agreements and multilateral institutions do serve the function Bagwell 
and Staiger propose, my claim is that James’ theory of fairness in trade cannot find 
support in their position.6 On Bagwell and Staiger’s explanation, the GATT/WTO was 
formed as a solution to a cooperation problem among large states. Once a rule-based 
trading system was in place, it was attractive for existing members to have small states 
join and for the new entrants to accept its rules. 7 Nevertheless, among the members 
of the WTO, only the large states forgo gains in national income that could result from 
strategic protectionism. Small states do not have the capacity to alter the global terms 
of trade, and thus none of their trading partners gain ‘assurance’ from their agreement 
to refrain from doing so.8 However, restricting the scope of the argument to large states 
would be a severe limitation to James’ theory of fairness in trade. It would imply that 
poor and developing countries are unable to claim the trade regime treats them 
unfairly: only large states with market power could claim to have received a ‘bad’ or 
‘unfair’ deal.  
 
Finally, the dominant position among political economists is that state leaders use 
trade agreements and institutions to resolve domestic conflicts over trade liberalization 
(Goldstein, 2017). For the two positions I have described above, the domestic 
distributional consequences of trade liberalization are unintended and peripheral to 
the function of agreements. By contrast, political economists argue a state participates 
in a trade agreement for the very reason that some domestic groups will be 
disadvantaged by trade liberalization. Some groups will lose competitive advantages, 
experience economic dislocations, and suffer other setbacks as a result of trade 
liberalization. Domestic legislative processes to reduce barriers to trade can be 
blocked by these groups, when they are politically powerful. Political leaders use trade 
                                                     
6
 Some economists have expressed scepticism that Bagwell and Staiger’s theoretical result actually 
explains the historical development of the GATT/WTO or the contemporary functioning of the WTO. 
7
 Bagwell and Staiger propose that a rule-based system assuaged small countries’ fears that they 
would be exploited by large countries (2002, p. 69). See Gowa and Kim (2005) for evidence these 
fears were warranted. 
8
 On the difficulty of integrating developing countries’ concerns into the WTO, on Bagwell and 
Staiger’s account of the WTO’s function, see Bagwell and Staiger (2014).  
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agreements and institutions to assemble a broader domestic coalition in favour of 
trade liberalization (including exporters who will benefit from access to foreign 
markets) or to bypass the normal domestic legislative processes. This position on the 
function of trade agreements and institutions has not been explicitly referenced in 
support of normative or evaluative claims about the quality of trade deals. 9  
 
This paper sketches an account of a ‘bad deal’ that draws from the third position about 
the function of trade agreements and institutions. According to this third position, 
political leaders’ motivations are either to seek out gains in national income or to 
provide economic advantages for a set of interest groups that will support her political 
survival. My account of a ‘bad deal’ is specified in reference to the former motivation 
and not the latter. Trade agreements and trade institutions provide a state with gains 
in national income, as a result of reductions in barriers to trade on the part of the state 
itself as well as its trading partners. For the issues covered in the trade agreement, 
the state’s policy positions on these issues would have been determined through its 
normal legislative processes. What the state contributes to the trade agreement is a 
portion of its policy space. A trade agreement is a ‘bad deal’ when the gains in national 
income are low, relative to the value of the policy space. What is distinctive about my 
account is that the value of the policy space, and thus the cost the state incurs for 
contributing its policy space, is not measured in economic terms.10 On my account, 
policy space is valuable when it is essential for the society’s ‘competency’ or its 
‘inclusiveness.’ 11 For instance, a trade agreement that limits a state’s ability to provide 
food security may undermine its ‘competency’ (since food security is a core function) 
and its ‘inclusiveness’ (since it loss disproportionately impacts the poor), even if the 
trade agreement makes the society better off economically.12  
 
This requires a brief explanation of how contributions of states’ policy space produce 
gains in national income. When a trade agreement or institution requires a state to 
lower tariffs, for instance, the state has a policy removed from its set of legally 
permissible possibilities—the option to retain tariffs. Tariffs are one form of state 
regulation that make it more expensive for consumers and domestic firms to purchase 
goods from foreign producers, which undermines the society’s shift to the production 
                                                     
9
 Although see Loriaux (forthcoming), who argues that a trade agreement can be unfair for domestic 
groups, particularly those at risk of unemployment. More generally on the importance of domestic 
distributional issues in trade agreements, see Dietsch (2017). 
10
 The policy space could be valued in economic terms, as in James’ position that states have 
refrained from opportunities for additional gains in national income. It could also represent terms of 
setbacks to the economic interests of the ‘losers’ from trade liberalization. See also Stiglitz and 
Charlton (2005: 85-6) on the requirement to respect poor countries’ policy space in trade agreements 
so that they can find their own optimal strategies for development. 
11
 My account finds support from Dani Rodrik, who has said, ‘The time has come to embrace a 
different logic, that of “exchange of policy space,’” (2016). Rodrik (2012) characterizes the value of 
policy space in terms of democratic sovereignty, while I separate the two values of ‘competency’ and 
‘inclusiveness,’ which are present to some degree in non-democratic states as well as democratic 
ones.  
12
 A comparable policy issue for rich countries is food safety standards. 
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of goods in which it has a comparative advantage. Any state regulations that have the 
effect of favouring domestic producers will hinder the state’s shift towards 
specialization in the production to goods in which the society has a comparative 
advantage. Multilateral and mega-regional trade institutions require their members to 
harmonize their regulations and refrain from certain policy options that have the effect 
of favouring their domestic producers over foreign producers. Greater contributions of 
policy space typically correspond to greater economic gains: the EU’s Single Market 
and Customs Union demand a high degree of policy coordination and produce 
significant economic benefits, while the policy coordination in the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership and its estimated economic benefits for members both will be less 
significant.13 
 
This section has described three major positions in the scholarly literature on the 
function of trade agreements and trade institutions, and I have argued only the last 
can support the claim that a state has received a ‘bad’ deal for its citizens. This paper 
supplies an account of a ‘bad deal’ by appealing to the non-economic costs, in terms 
of a state’s valuable policy space, incurred through its participation in trade 
agreements and institutions. I have in mind an objective standard of the value of policy 
space, rather than a view that particular interest groups assign high value to certain 
policy areas. Policy space matters when it contributes to the competence and 
inclusiveness of a society. Disadvantaged groups have a particular stake in their 
society’s competencies, since they depend on its services, and in their state’s 
commitment to including them in the benefits of prosperity. In the next section, I will 
argue that the WTO’s norms of procedural fairness are best suited to answer a state’s 
complaint about its ‘bad deal’ when we assume a mercantilist theory of trade, which is 
a discredited theory of trade not surveyed in this section. 
 
2. Global procedural fairness in trade 
 
Political leaders often complain that the WTO and mega-regional trade institutions are 
procedurally unfair, by way of explanation for how their state has received a ‘bad deal’ 
from its participation. The WTO’s principles of ‘reciprocity’ and ‘non-discrimination’ are 
norms of procedural fairness that provide a response to this complaint. In this section 
of the paper, I will argue that the WTO’s principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination 
are only adequate for responding to a state that views its ‘bad deal’ in terms of a 
mercantilist theory of trade. In making this argument, I draw from the work of several 
defenders of special and differential treatment for developing countries. Their 
criticisms can be taken further, in my view, because they provide the grounds for a 
thorough-going rejection of the WTO’s principles of ‘reciprocity’ and ‘non-
discrimination.’ While defenders of special and treatment have seemed reluctant to 
                                                     
13
 For the U.S., there was an estimated potential benefit of 0.5% of GDP for participating in the Trans-
Pacific Partnership, at the cost of policy space in food standards, technical barriers, and most 
controversially, regulation of services trade and investment (Petri and Plummer, 2016). 
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endorse unilateral and bilateral decision-making, their arguments provide grounds for 
a justification of these procedures.  
 
According to the principle of reciprocity, when a member of the WTO agrees to lower 
its barriers to trade, other members should reciprocate with an reduction in their 
barriers to trade for that state’s goods and services that has equivalent economic 
value. According to the principle of non-discrimination, a member of the WTO cannot 
lower its barriers to trade for foreign producers in some WTO member states but not 
others. All WTO member states are to be treated according to the ‘Most Favoured 
Nation’ principle, meaning that they face the same schedule of tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers to trade. These two principles, ‘reciprocity’ and ‘non-discrimination,’ represent 
fair procedures to resolve conflicts of interest between states that follow a mercantilist 
theory of trade.14 On a mercantilist theory of trade, a state wishes to retain its own 
barriers to trade in order to limit imports, while it would like its own exporters to enjoy 
favourable access to foreign markets. Lowering barriers to trade is viewed as an 
economically costly concession, and thus in a trade agreement, states agree to take 
‘reciprocal’ measures to lower their own barriers to trade. When states lower their 
barriers to trade for producers from only some members of the WTO, they 
‘discriminate’ against foreign producers that have higher barriers to access the state’s 
markets, in comparison to domestic or other foreign producers. 15  
 
Many commentators have argued that developing countries do not actually enjoy 
‘reciprocity’ with the rich countries. Granting access to the markets of developing 
countries has less economic value for producers in rich countries, in comparison to 
the significant economic gains at stake for developing country producers in gaining 
access to rich countries’ markets. Due to differences in the economic value of access 
to markets, a formal principle of reciprocity fails to produce equivalent reductions in 
barriers to trade for rich countries and poor ones. Rich countries retain relatively high 
‘tariff peaks’ on goods from developing countries, such as clothing and textiles, and 
significant non-tariff barriers to trade on goods in which developing countries could 
have a comparative advantage, such as agricultural products. This failure to achieve 
reciprocity in trade agreements in the WTO provides support for a suspension of the 
formal rule of reciprocity, in favour of special and differential treatment for developing 
countries.  
 
Special and differential treatment has several elements, including permissions for 
developing countries to implement WTO rules and agreements on a longer time-
frame, and assistance for developing countries to participate fully in trade negotiations. 
Since the Doha ‘Development’ round has failed, what is more interesting at present 
are the elements of special and differential treatment that apply to unilateral and 
                                                     
14
 As previously mentioned, Bagwell and Staiger (2002) explain the function of these principles 
differently, but others have noted that their theoretical predictions yield equivalent observations if 
states are motivated to increase national income or if they are motivated solely to increase exports. 
15
 See Christensen (2015) for criticisms of the WTO’s principles of formal equality.  
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bilateral trade. Special and differential treatment permits rich countries that are 
members of the WTO to unilaterally liberalize their barriers to trade for developing 
countries. It also permits developing countries to liberalize trade amongst themselves, 
without granting the same access to their markets to producers from rich countries. 
Defenders of special and differential treatment typically argue that it is compatible with 
the WTO’s core commitments. Ethan Kapstein argues that special and differential 
treatment helps to create a ‘level playing field’ for poor countries to enjoy opportunities 
for economic growth (2006: 49-44).  Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton appeal to 
procedural fairness and substantive fairness in prospects for development to justify 
special and differential treatment (2005: 87-105).  
 
To illustrate the conflict between special and differential treatment and the WTO’s 
principles of procedural fairness, I will describe what happens when a rich state makes 
a unilateral decision to lower its barriers to trade for a developing country. The 
developing countries is not required to reciprocate with reductions in its own barriers 
to trade, and let’s presume it does not reciprocity. This could be viewed as a partial 
step towards restoring reciprocity between rich and poor countries, because it reduces 
the excess in one rich country’s barriers to trade with a poor country. However, as a 
result of the rich country’s decision, another rich country’s producers will find 
themselves at a competitive disadvantage in comparison to the poor country’s 
producers, resulting in diminished exports for the second rich country. This provides a 
‘bad deal’ for the second rich country, understood in mercantilist terms, and a ‘good 
deal’ for the poor country. The costs of the first rich country’s decision, understood in 
mercantilist terms of balanced imports and exports, are not borne by it alone as it 
accepts greater imports from developing countries. The second rich country bears 
these costs as well, in terms of its diminished exports to the first rich country. Notably, 
the second rich country bears these costs even if it also has extended special and 
differential treatment to developing countries.16  
 
Defenders of special and differential treatment are reluctant to justify unilateral trade 
liberalization on the part of rich countries or developed countries’ retention of their 
barriers to trade, but their reasons are unrelated to principles of reciprocity and non-
discrimination at stake in the scenario above. Stiglitz and Charlton argue that rich 
countries have not done enough to liberalize on a unilateral basis, because it is 
discretionary rather than enforced upon them. Moreover, it is cumbersome for 
developing countries to prove compliance with ‘rules of origin’ in the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP). Instead, Stiglitz and Charlton propose a rules-based 
system, which they call the Doha Market Access Proposal, which would require all 
WTO members to provide free market access to all developing countries ‘poorer and 
smaller than themselves’ (2005: 94-103). Stiglitz and Charlton also argue that 
                                                     
16
 We can also substitute a second developing country for the second rich country. On developing 
country challenges to GSP, see Grossman and Sykes (2005).  
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developing countries ought to reduce their barriers to trade for their own benefit.17 
Kapstein also expresses ambivalence over rich countries’ unilateral liberalization: he 
views it as a small move towards ‘diffuse reciprocity,’ but notes it lacks reciprocation 
from developing states. 18 He also notes developing countries would gain in their 
prospects for development and growth from reducing their own barriers to trade (2006: 
69-71).19  
 
Ultimately what seems to matter for defenders of special and differential treatment is 
that trade liberalization should take place in such a way as to extend poor countries’ 
chances for growth and development.  Reducing barriers to trade matters insofar as it 
contributes towards those ends. There is scope for disagreement (in light of current 
political conditions) about whether unilateral liberalization is a feasible strategy for 
improving poor countries’ chances for development. What special and differential 
treatment defenders have rejected is the idea that reciprocal reductions in barriers to 
trade are a distinctive object of procedural fairness. 20 In other words, they set aside 
the mercantilist theory of trade that underwrites the WTO’s principles of reciprocity and 
non-discrimination. 21 I will argue now that defenders of special and differential 
treatment also offer the basis for a more general rejection of the WTO’s principles of 
procedural fairness in trade.  
 
First, defenders of special and differential treatment must believe that trade policy 
ought to discriminate amongst states on the basis of their level of economic 
development. The reason it is valid to take development into account is that it matters 
more for societies to enjoy the gains from trade (whatever these gains are) when 
societies have low levels of economic development.22 Special and differential 
treatment in unilateral and bilateral trade policy involves many differentiations among 
members of the general class of ‘developing’ countries, although it is a single category 
for the WTO. When a country receives special and differential treatment in GSP or 
preferential trade agreements, the country’s particular conditions are subject to 
                                                     
17
 They recommend that developing countries be afforded a longer time-scale, with greater allowance 
for their ‘policy space’ and the benefit of technical assistance. They recommend that ‘South-South’ 
barriers to trade should be reduced considerably. 
18
 Kapstein endorses ‘diffuse’ reciprocity with reference to the broader function of norms of fairness in 
supporting the perceived legitimacy of the international order (2006: 31-38).  
19
 For evidence that developing countries fail to reduce their own barriers to trade as a result of being 
beneficiaries of GSP programmes, see Özden and Reinhardt (2005).  
20
 See Caney (2012) on the isolationist and integrationist approaches to issues of global justice. 
Defenders of special and differential treatment take an integrationist approach by viewing trade in 
terms of the larger aims of global distributive justice. 
21
 Brown and Stern (2012) argue that reciprocity fails to achieve equality of opportunity. See also 
Brown and Stern (2007) in support of equality of opportunity and distributive justice as principles to 
govern trade. Brock (2009: 227-232) argues that the WTO already realizes ‘diffuse reciprocity’ as 
Kapstein defines it, and she proposes a different principle to aim for. While I do not disagree with 
these views, my argument has focused on the mercantilist theory of trade that underwrites the 
principle of reciprocity in the WTO.  
22
 There are a plurality of reasons why it could matter more to benefit these states, including 
instrumental and intrinsic reasons (I describe both below). 
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scrutiny in light of the programme or the agreement’s stipulated conditions for 
eligibility.23 Once a division has been made between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ 
countries, it seems valid to discriminate further by taking gradations in levels of 
development into account, although the WTO does not do so.  
   
I believe there is another valid criterion for differentiation amongst developing 
countries in trade policy that is consistent with the justification for special and 
differential treatment. Some societies are politically inclusive, such that the gains from 
trade are more likely to be widely shared amongst its members. In addition, some 
societies have the institutional competences that permit them to take advantage of 
opportunities to specialize in their comparative advantage, increasing their income and 
perhaps even their chances to develop. Perhaps taking into account these forms of 
political differentiation, which I call ‘competency’ and ‘inclusiveness’ is a step further 
than defenders of special and differential treatment wish to go. However, they have 
opened up the possibility of such differentiations with their argument in favour of a 
distinction between developed and developing countries, against the WTO’s principle 
that a state’s trade policy should not ‘discriminate’ amongst WTO member states.  
 
Second, I argue that special and differential treatment provides a precedent for the 
rejection of reciprocal procedures of decision-making in trade.  Special and differential 
treatment do not restore reciprocal decision-making as a procedure for decision-
making in the WTO, as Kapstein rightly notes. The permissions granted by special and 
differential treatment allow rich countries to address the consequences that result from 
the WTO’s failure to achieve reciprocal procedures, namely, the failure to reduce 
barriers to trade for producers in developing countries. It permits rich countries to 
unilaterally select goods and services on which they will reduce barriers to trade for 
producers in developing countries, which Stiglitz and Charlton rightly note means that 
rich countries retain discretion. The reason unilateral liberalization is acceptable 
nonetheless is that it can be expected to produce economic benefits for poor countries. 
It may be true that many poor countries should reduce their own barriers to trade to 
aid their own development, but if they choose not to do so it remains an ethical duty 
for rich countries to liberalize for their benefit.  
 
I have argued there are several respects in which defenders of special and differential 
treatment have departed from the principles of procedural fairness that govern the 
WTO. Defenses of special and differential treatment have rejected the mercantilist 
framework that underlies many political leaders’ claims that their state has received a 
‘bad deal,’ which are answered by the WTO’s norms of procedural fairness. Special 
and differential treatment implies that it matters more to provide a developing country 
with the gains of trade than a rich country, which provides a justification for 
                                                     
23
 The WTO allows states to self-identify as ‘developing,’ and all states that are classed as 
‘developing’ can be granted special and differential treatment. Within WTO negotiations, developing 
countries are increasingly voting and bargaining as a ‘bloc,’ despite the important differences in their 
interests (Narlikar, 2010).  
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discrimination on this criterion (to which I add political criteria I believe are also valid). 
While its defenders have hesitated to endorse this element of special and differential 
treatment, it does licence unilateral decision-making on the part of rich states for the 
benefit of poor countries. The next section of this paper will provide greater scrutiny 
and defense of the position that unilateral decision-making has risks, namely of the 
abuse of power, but is valuable nonetheless insofar as it brings about improvements 
in the global distribution of the gains from trade.  
 
3. Global distributive equality 
 
This section charts a path forward in navigating the competing concerns for domestic 
equality, global procedural fairness, and global distributional equality. While I agree 
with Tesón that it is ethically important to provide economic benefits to people in poor 
countries through trade liberalization, I will argue that full liberalization would require 
excessive contributions of a state’s valuable policy space. Since states have only a 
limited imperative to liberalize trade, I will argue that they should carefully choose the 
states with which they will liberalize (‘discriminate’) on a unilateral basis (without 
‘reciprocity’). Relevant criteria for selection, in my view, include both economic 
development and their political competencies and inclusiveness. These political and 
economic factors are a valid basis for differential treatment, in order to direct the gains 
from trade to where they can go further to achieve global distributional equality. I will 
further note the limitations in the WTO, in order to describe the ways in which a state’s 
unilateral and bilateral trade policies can do better (and the ways in which they are 
likely to do worse). 
 
I endorse the position that unilateral trade liberalization on the part of rich states will 
result in economic gains for poor countries. While Tesón describes a duty of 
humanitarianism to provide economic gains to poor countries, many would endorse 
the duty as a requirement of global distributional equality. What I find problematic 
about Tesón’s argument is that it cannot abide a limit on the duty of a state to liberalize 
trade. The heart of the economic case for a state to reduce its barriers to trade is that 
it is in the national interest to gain aggregate income, and no relevant costs.24 Since it 
is costless for the rich state, and there are significant potential gains for poor states, it 
is required for rich states to liberalize trade as much as possible for reasons of both 
rationality and ethics. As I argued in the first part of this paper, there is no basis for a 
universal claim that a state has received a ‘bad deal’ from trade liberalization, when 
costs and benefits are defined solely in economic terms. The problem arises for all 
theories of justice in trade that define the function of a trade agreement in economic 
terms alone.  
                                                     
24
 The economic costs of trade liberalization are borne by domestic groups, who experience 
dislocations from exposure to foreign competition. Of course, the possibility of compensating these 
groups does not imply that they are actually compensated and in the kind of economic goods they 
have lost (such as jobs).  
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A state can receive a ‘bad deal’ from its participation in trade agreements because 
these provide economic benefits and require contributions of policy space that have 
non-economic value. I am not referring to a subjective valuation of the economic 
benefits and the policy space, in the view of the state’s political leaders or citizens. 
Prospective gains in national income are more valuable for a society at a lower level 
of economic development, in comparison to a society at a higher level of development. 
I mean to say that the same quantity of prospective gains in national income will 
provide a ‘better deal’ to the society at a lower level of development, even if the 
members of these societies do not see it this way. This is because the society at a 
lower level of economic development can do more with the same gains in national 
income to improve its members’ lives. The value of policy space is also objective, 
meaning that a trade agreement can represent a ‘bad deal’ because it requires 
valuable policy space, even if its political leaders and citizens do not perceive it to be 
so (and vice versa for a ‘good deal’). Fulfilling the core ‘competencies’ of a society—
such as security, the rule of law, a functioning economy, and so on—or ensuring its 
‘inclusiveness’ can be compromised by the state’s legal requirement to refrain from 
certain policy options, due to its participation in a trade agreement or institution.25  
 
It is not a requirement of rationality that a state should participate in a trade agreement 
or trade institution that involves full liberalization, due to the costs of valuable policy 
space. One objection is that the state still ought to fully liberalize on a unilateral basis, 
since this involves no binding legal commitment to refrain from certain policy choices. 
In my view, unilateral liberalization does involve a commitment of policy space, albeit 
to a lesser degree: there will be gains in national income only if market actors believe 
certain policy options will be off the table for an extended period.26 Thus, the same 
tradeoff remains between the value of the economic gains at stake and the value of 
the policy space. To determine whether a trade policy represents a ‘good deal’ for the 
state, my account raises the following questions: 1) how much economic gain is at 
stake in this trade policy and how valuable is it, given the society’s level of 
development? 2) which policy options are removed from the domestic legislative 
process, and to what extent are these issues essential for the society’s competency 
and inclusiveness? My account sets out an appropriate framework for debate, for 
instance, about whether it makes sense for rich or poor states to press for a new round 
of multilateral negotiations in the WTO or if membership in the EU’s Single Market and 
Customs Union provides a ‘good deal’ for Britain. 
 
                                                     
25
 I would also include the fiscal commitments of the state’s participation in trade institutions, since 
high costs can undermine the state’s competences and inclusiveness. While the ‘Leave’ campaign for 
the Brexit referendum made specious claims that more money would be available for the NHS after 
leaving the EU, since the UK would no longer be obligated to make financial contributions to the EU, if 
the claim had been based in fact it would have been a valid argument. See also Banai (2017) on the 
costs to sovereignty from investor-state arbitration in trade and investment agreements. 
26
 Policy options can be off limits for non-legal reasons as well, see Dietsch (2015) on the costs to 
sovereignty from the phenomenon of global tax competition. 
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My account supports a limit on the ethical duty of a rich country to reduce its barriers 
to trade. The value of the state’s policy space is weighted against the prospect of 
national income gains for poor countries. Exactly how stringent a limit on the duty of 
trade liberalization cannot be specified here, since cosmopolitans and nationalists will 
disagree about the relative weights of these two values. However, the WTO seems ill-
equipped to balance both. In the WTO, policy space is recognized as an important 
limitation on trade agreements and trade negotiations only for the sake of developing 
countries and only for the reason that it is essential to their development. On my view, 
all states contribute policy space through their participation in trade agreements, and 
this policy space has potential objective importance for maintaining competency and 
inclusiveness. This value should be recognized alongside the ethical imperative to 
help poor countries develop, whether it is for reasons of humanitarianism or global 
egalitarianism. 
 
Since states have a limited imperative to liberalize trade, they should carefully choose 
the states with which they will liberalize (‘discriminate’), even if it occurs on a unilateral 
basis (without ‘reciprocity’). As discussed in the second part of this paper, defenders 
of special and differential treatment have provided the basis for a rejection of the 
WTO’s principles of non-discrimination and reciprocity in the reduction of barriers to 
trade. Rejecting these principles allows a rich country, on a unilateral basis, to do more 
to liberalize trade with countries whose economic gains matter more from the 
perspective of global ethics. I have also indicated that relevant criteria of selection 
include a state’s level of economic development, as well as its political competence 
and inclusiveness. It is better to direct trade liberalization towards countries that have 
higher levels of competency and inclusiveness, because these countries are better 
positioned to take advantage of the economic gains from trade liberalization.27 From 
a cosmopolitan perspective, it is also better to direct economic gains to inclusive 
societies because they will share the gains from trade with disadvantaged domestic 
groups, such as their impoverished and working classes.   
 
One competing consideration is that the WTO’s norms of procedural fairness are 
useful for avoiding unilateral abuses of power. Binding multilateral rules prevent a state 
from employing arbitrary criteria for selecting trading partners, such as their political 
support. It is well known that rich countries tend to have perferential trade agreements 
with their political allies and, for European states, with their former colonies. Stiglitz 
and Charlton express concern that unilateral decision-making gives rich states the 
discretion to fail to liberalize substantially with poor countries, but they do not offer 
principled objections to unilateral decision-making as a procedure.28 By contrast, the 
concern considered here is that unilateral decision-making grants discretion for rich 
countries to make liberalization conditional upon inappropriate features of their 
                                                     
27
 See Winters et. al. (2004: 77) on policies that may help trade liberalization promote growth, such as 
‘effective conflict resolution’; in my view, such policies presuppose certain competencies.  
28
 See Limao (2006) in support of the view that multilateral liberalization offers superior prospects for 
economic gains to poor countries.  
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prospective trading partners.29 While ideally rich countries would refrain from abusing 
their discretion over their poor country trading partners, it is obviously a drawback of 
unilateral decision-making in general that it is not rule-based. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has identified several points of conflict between concerns of domestic 
equality, global procedural fairness, and global distributional equality. Trade 
liberalization is important for improving the economic prospects of poor countries, for 
humanitarian reasons and reasons of global distributional equality. However, a state’s 
participation in a trade agreement can represent contributions of its valuable policy 
space, which can have the most importance for domestic disadvantaged groups. 
Finally, the WTO’s principles of procedural fairness are at odds with special and 
differential treatment and with my recommendations for a state’s unilateral and 
bilateral trade policy, which restricts a potential mechanism to achieve greater global 
distributional equality. A state should aim to: i) pursue gains in national income, without 
making excessive contributions of its ‘policy space’ on issues that matter for 
disadvantaged groups; ii) refrain from abusing its unilateral decision-making power 
over its trading partners; and iii) prioritize trade liberalization with poor countries that 
have the competencies to take advantage of economic opportunities and that are likely 
to share the benefits of prosperity with disadvantaged citizens. 
 
One objection will be raised but not fully answered here: it is better to seek to reform 
multilateral trade institutions, rather than weaken them through unilateral and bilateral 
trade liberalization. I have taken as given that states represent an increasingly 
important site of decision-making on trade, and indicated the possibilities for 
improvements (and setbacks) in what matters about equality. This paper in no way 
detracts from proposals to reform the WTO and regional trade institutions, and indeed 
its account of the stakes of trade policy may be relevant for such proposals.30  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
29
 On ‘non-trade reciprocity’ in the EU’s GSP+ programme, see Ornelas (2016: 380-381). 
30
 I agree with Bagwell, Staiger, and Bown (2016) that the WTO has continuing relevance, despite the 
proliferation of preferential trade agreements. One possible reform of the WTO that is compatible with 
my argument here is a shift to ‘plurilateral’ agreements. 
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